SergioandClaude Opus 4.8
1731e7ef23
Cablea el Stage 0 del bootstrap a la CLI: subcomando `bootstrap stage0 --url --sha256 --version [--seed zig|musl-cross-make]` que abre el store, arma el SeedSpec y llama a hammer_bootstrap::stage0, imprimiendo el b3 del artefacto sellado. - stage0 ahora limpia el staging `.bootstrap-tmp` pase lo que pase (extraído stage0_into): un sha256 erróneo ya no deja el tarball a medio descargar bajo el store. Test reforzado para afirmarlo. - e2e de CLL `bootstrap_cli.rs`: tarball falso vía file:// → sella + imprime hash, idempotente, sha erróneo falla sin sellar. Sin red. Docs SDD 11 §5 y roadmap marcan Stage 0 (lib+CLI) hecho; Stage 1/2 pendientes. Workspace 219 verde. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
77 lines
2.8 KiB
Rust
77 lines
2.8 KiB
Rust
//! E2E del CLI `hammer bootstrap stage0` (track posterior, SDD 11). Construye un tarball de
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//! semilla falso, lo ingiere vía `file://` (sin red) y verifica el camino completo:
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//! sella + imprime el hash, es idempotente, y un sha256 erróneo falla sin sellar.
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::process::Command;
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const BIN: &str = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_hammer");
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fn sha256_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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let mut h = Sha256::new();
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h.update(bytes);
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hex::encode(h.finalize())
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}
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/// Crea un tarball con `bin/zig` dentro y devuelve `(url file://, sha256 hex)`.
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fn make_seed_tarball(dir: &Path) -> (String, String) {
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let src = dir.join("src");
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std::fs::create_dir_all(src.join("bin")).unwrap();
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std::fs::write(src.join("bin/zig"), b"#!/bin/sh\necho fake zig\n").unwrap();
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let tarball = dir.join("seed.tar.gz");
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let st = Command::new("tar")
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.arg("-czf")
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.arg(&tarball)
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.arg("-C")
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.arg(&src)
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.arg(".")
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.status()
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.unwrap();
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assert!(st.success());
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let sha = sha256_hex(&std::fs::read(&tarball).unwrap());
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(format!("file://{}", tarball.display()), sha)
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}
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fn stage0(store: &Path, url: &str, sha256: &str, version: &str) -> std::process::Output {
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Command::new(BIN)
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.arg("--store")
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.arg(store)
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.args(["bootstrap", "stage0", "--url"])
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.arg(url)
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.args(["--sha256", sha256, "--version", version])
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.output()
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.unwrap()
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}
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#[test]
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fn stage0_seals_idempotent_and_rejects_bad_sha() {
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let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
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let (url, sha) = make_seed_tarball(tmp.path());
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let store = tmp.path().join("store");
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// --- primera ingestión: sella e imprime el hash ---
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let out = stage0(&store, &url, &sha, "0.13.0");
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assert!(out.status.success(), "stderr: {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr));
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let hash = String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap().trim().to_string();
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assert!(hash.starts_with("b3:"), "hash inesperado: {hash}");
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// El artefacto está en el store con el contenido extraído.
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let zig = store.join(format!("{}-seed-zig", hash.trim_start_matches("b3:"))).join("bin/zig");
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assert!(zig.is_file(), "bin/zig debe existir en el artefacto sellado");
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// --- idempotente: mismo hash, sin re-sellar ---
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let out2 = stage0(&store, &url, &sha, "0.13.0");
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assert!(out2.status.success());
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assert_eq!(String::from_utf8(out2.stdout).unwrap().trim(), hash);
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// --- sha erróneo: falla y no sella un artefacto nuevo ---
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let bad = stage0(&store, &url, &"0".repeat(64), "bad");
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assert!(!bad.status.success(), "un sha erróneo debe fallar");
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assert!(
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&bad.stderr).contains("sha256 mismatch"),
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"stderr: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&bad.stderr)
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);
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}
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