CLI: hammer bootstrap stage0 + limpieza de staging y e2e
Cablea el Stage 0 del bootstrap a la CLI: subcomando `bootstrap stage0 --url --sha256 --version [--seed zig|musl-cross-make]` que abre el store, arma el SeedSpec y llama a hammer_bootstrap::stage0, imprimiendo el b3 del artefacto sellado. - stage0 ahora limpia el staging `.bootstrap-tmp` pase lo que pase (extraído stage0_into): un sha256 erróneo ya no deja el tarball a medio descargar bajo el store. Test reforzado para afirmarlo. - e2e de CLL `bootstrap_cli.rs`: tarball falso vía file:// → sella + imprime hash, idempotente, sha erróneo falla sin sellar. Sin red. Docs SDD 11 §5 y roadmap marcan Stage 0 (lib+CLI) hecho; Stage 1/2 pendientes. Workspace 219 verde. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Sergio
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
3d6d25661c
commit
1731e7ef23
@@ -97,6 +97,20 @@ pub fn stage0(seed: &SeedSpec, store: &Store) -> Result<ArtifactHash> {
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let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&work);
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std::fs::create_dir_all(&work)?;
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// El cuerpo fallible va aparte para limpiar el staging pase lo que pase (un sha erróneo
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// no debe dejar el tarball a medio descargar bajo el store).
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let result = stage0_into(seed, store, &h, &name, &work);
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let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&work);
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result
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}
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fn stage0_into(
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seed: &SeedSpec,
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store: &Store,
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h: &ArtifactHash,
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name: &str,
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work: &Path,
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) -> Result<ArtifactHash> {
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let tarball = work.join("seed.tar");
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download::fetch_url_to_file(&seed.url, &tarball)?;
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// Integridad antes de tocar nada: hash erróneo ⇒ no se extrae ni se sella.
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@@ -106,12 +120,9 @@ pub fn stage0(seed: &SeedSpec, store: &Store) -> Result<ArtifactHash> {
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std::fs::create_dir_all(&tree)?;
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untar(&tarball, &tree)?;
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let sealed = store.seal(&tree, &h, &name)?;
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let sealed = store.seal(&tree, h, name)?;
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tracing::info!(path = %sealed.display(), hash = %h, "stage0: semilla sellada");
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// Limpieza del staging (el árbol ya se movió por rename; queda el tarball + el dir padre).
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let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&work);
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Ok(h)
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Ok(h.clone())
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}
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/// Extrae `tarball` dentro de `into`. `tar -xf` autodetecta gzip/xz/zstd según lo instalado.
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@@ -229,5 +240,11 @@ mod tests {
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!store.has(&seed.seed_hash(), &seed.store_name()),
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"un sha erróneo no debe sellar nada"
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);
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// Tampoco debe dejar staging a medio descargar bajo el store.
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assert!(
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!store.root().join(".bootstrap-tmp").exists()
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|| std::fs::read_dir(store.root().join(".bootstrap-tmp")).unwrap().next().is_none(),
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"el staging debe quedar limpio tras el fallo"
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);
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}
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}
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ llm-claude = ["hammer-agent/llm-claude"]
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[dependencies]
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hammer-core.workspace = true
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hammer-build.workspace = true
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hammer-bootstrap.workspace = true
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hammer-overlay.workspace = true
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hammer-journal.workspace = true
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hammer-agent.workspace = true
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@@ -33,3 +34,5 @@ tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
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[dev-dependencies]
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tempfile.workspace = true
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base64.workspace = true
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sha2.workspace = true
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hex.workspace = true
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@@ -224,6 +224,32 @@ enum Cmd {
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#[arg(long)]
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fs_root: Option<PathBuf>,
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},
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/// [Track posterior] Bootstrap from-scratch (SDD 11). Encadena el toolchain semilla y el
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/// userland mínimo hacia el auto-alojamiento.
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Bootstrap {
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#[command(subcommand)]
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sub: BootstrapCmd,
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},
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}
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#[derive(Subcommand)]
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enum BootstrapCmd {
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/// [Stage 0] Ingiere un toolchain semilla pinned al store. Verifica el sha256 antes de
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/// extraer y lo sella; idempotente si ya está. Imprime el hash del artefacto.
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Stage0 {
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/// URL del tarball del toolchain (cualquier esquema de curl; `file://` para offline).
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#[arg(long)]
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url: String,
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/// sha256 hex del tarball, fijado. Se verifica antes de sellar.
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#[arg(long)]
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sha256: String,
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/// Versión de la semilla (entra en la identidad/hash del artefacto).
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#[arg(long)]
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version: String,
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/// Clase de semilla.
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#[arg(long, default_value = "zig")]
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seed: String,
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},
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}
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fn print_event(ev: &hammer_journal::MutationEvent, format: &str) {
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@@ -427,6 +453,19 @@ fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
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Cmd::Query { expr, base_ref, fs_root } => {
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run_query(&expr, base_ref.as_deref(), fs_root.as_deref())?;
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}
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Cmd::Bootstrap { sub } => match sub {
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BootstrapCmd::Stage0 { url, sha256, version, seed } => {
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let kind = match seed.as_str() {
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"zig" => hammer_bootstrap::SeedKind::Zig,
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"musl-cross-make" => hammer_bootstrap::SeedKind::MuslCrossMake,
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other => anyhow::bail!("--seed debe ser 'zig' o 'musl-cross-make', no '{other}'"),
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};
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let store = hammer_core::Store::open(&cli.store)?;
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let spec = hammer_bootstrap::SeedSpec { kind, version, url, sha256 };
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let hash = hammer_bootstrap::stage0(&spec, &store)?;
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println!("{hash}");
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}
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},
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
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//! E2E del CLI `hammer bootstrap stage0` (track posterior, SDD 11). Construye un tarball de
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//! semilla falso, lo ingiere vía `file://` (sin red) y verifica el camino completo:
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//! sella + imprime el hash, es idempotente, y un sha256 erróneo falla sin sellar.
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::process::Command;
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const BIN: &str = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_hammer");
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fn sha256_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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let mut h = Sha256::new();
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h.update(bytes);
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hex::encode(h.finalize())
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}
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/// Crea un tarball con `bin/zig` dentro y devuelve `(url file://, sha256 hex)`.
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fn make_seed_tarball(dir: &Path) -> (String, String) {
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let src = dir.join("src");
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std::fs::create_dir_all(src.join("bin")).unwrap();
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std::fs::write(src.join("bin/zig"), b"#!/bin/sh\necho fake zig\n").unwrap();
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let tarball = dir.join("seed.tar.gz");
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let st = Command::new("tar")
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.arg("-czf")
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.arg(&tarball)
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.arg("-C")
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.arg(&src)
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.arg(".")
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.status()
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.unwrap();
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assert!(st.success());
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let sha = sha256_hex(&std::fs::read(&tarball).unwrap());
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(format!("file://{}", tarball.display()), sha)
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}
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fn stage0(store: &Path, url: &str, sha256: &str, version: &str) -> std::process::Output {
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Command::new(BIN)
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.arg("--store")
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.arg(store)
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.args(["bootstrap", "stage0", "--url"])
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.arg(url)
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.args(["--sha256", sha256, "--version", version])
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.output()
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.unwrap()
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}
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#[test]
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fn stage0_seals_idempotent_and_rejects_bad_sha() {
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let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
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let (url, sha) = make_seed_tarball(tmp.path());
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let store = tmp.path().join("store");
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// --- primera ingestión: sella e imprime el hash ---
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let out = stage0(&store, &url, &sha, "0.13.0");
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assert!(out.status.success(), "stderr: {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr));
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let hash = String::from_utf8(out.stdout).unwrap().trim().to_string();
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assert!(hash.starts_with("b3:"), "hash inesperado: {hash}");
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// El artefacto está en el store con el contenido extraído.
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let zig = store.join(format!("{}-seed-zig", hash.trim_start_matches("b3:"))).join("bin/zig");
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assert!(zig.is_file(), "bin/zig debe existir en el artefacto sellado");
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// --- idempotente: mismo hash, sin re-sellar ---
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let out2 = stage0(&store, &url, &sha, "0.13.0");
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assert!(out2.status.success());
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assert_eq!(String::from_utf8(out2.stdout).unwrap().trim(), hash);
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// --- sha erróneo: falla y no sella un artefacto nuevo ---
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let bad = stage0(&store, &url, &"0".repeat(64), "bad");
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assert!(!bad.status.success(), "un sha erróneo debe fallar");
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assert!(
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&bad.stderr).contains("sha256 mismatch"),
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"stderr: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&bad.stderr)
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);
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}
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